The Ontological What?
An Argument for the Existence of God
By Bill Fortenberry
I was recently asked to consider an argument for the existence of God which is known as the ontological argument. At the time, I had heard a few different presentations of this argument, but they all seemed fairly shallow, and I hadn’t actually given it much thought. The more that I’ve studied this argument, however, the more I have come to appreciate it. I have found the ontological argument for God’s existence to be one of the best logical arguments available.
Unfortunately, the majority of the presentations of this argument are unintelligible to the average American. For example, the first recorded use of the ontological argument come from a man named Anselm who wrote the following in A.D. 1078:
“Thus even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be conceived is in the understanding, since when he hears this, he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. Thus if that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the understanding alone, then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is itself that than which a greater can be conceived. But surely this cannot be. Thus without doubt something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, both in the understanding and in reality.”
Anselm’s argument makes perfect sense, and it was well understood by the people of his day, but most modern readers are hopelessly confused by the end of the first sentence. Over the years, this original argument has received various updates and improvements until it finally reached its current form under the influence of Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. Dr. Craig’s presentation of Plantinga’s argument has become quite famous because of his inclusion of it in his debates with world renowned atheists. However, even this modern version is still unintelligible to most readers. Here is the Plantinga argument as presented by Dr. Craig:
Of course, most people can see that Dr. Craig is using the term “maximally great being” as a reference to God, but when he speaks of possible worlds and actual worlds and some possible worlds and every possible world, he tends to lose most of his audience. This is unfortunate because Dr. Craig’s argument just like that of Anselm is a very sound argument; it simply is not presented in a format that is of any benefit to the average American Christian.
Once I realized that the primary objection to the ontological argument is that it is incomprehensible, I began working on an alternative presentation. Before I could do that, however, I needed to make sure that I understood the argument correctly, so I went back to the original and read Anselm’s Proslogion in which he presented his argument. Then, I read Descartes’ Fifth Meditation to get his argument and so on all the way up to the current argument by Dr. Craig. Once I completed my reading, I decided to just rephrase the argument in my first rendition and then focus on simplicity in the second. Here is my first rendition:
A. Anything that is possible must exist if it is also necessary.
B. It is possible that God exists.
C. God is the greatest conceivable being.
D. The greatest conceivable being is one without whom nothing else could exist.
E. A being without whom nothing else could exist is a necessary being.
F. God is a necessary being. (C + D + E)
G. If it is possible that God exists, then He must exist necessarily.
H. Therefore God exists. (A + B + G)
As you can see, my first rendition shifted the focus from Anselm’s antiquated language of existing in the understanding versus existing in reality, but I found Plantinga’s possible worlds and actual worlds to be just as cumbersome. Instead of either of their terms, I chose to express my argument with the concepts of possibility and necessity. This change allowed me to present an irrefutable truth as my first premise – Anything that is possible must exist if it is also necessary.
To illustrate the truth of this statement, let me point out that there are things which are both necessary and impossible. For example, in order for 1+2=4 to be correct, it would be necessary for either the number 1 to be equal to the number 2 or for the number 4 to be equal to the number 3. Although one of these two is necessary, neither of them is possible, and we can conclude that the equation 1+2=4 does not exist as a true description of reality. To illustrate it another way, we could imagine an island with several palm trees. In order for an island to exist, it is both possible and necessary that it be surrounded by water. Therefore, if we know that we are on an island, then we can conclude that the island is surrounded by water. However, it is not necessary that the island have any palm trees on it. It is possible that there are palm trees, but it is not necessary. Therefore, we cannot conclude that there are palm trees nearby just because we know that we are on an island. There may be palm trees and there may not be palm trees. They are only possible and not necessary. Thus, we can see that the first premise of my argument is a true statement about how we can prove that something exists without actually observing it. If an object is both possible and necessary, then we can know that it exists whether we can see it or not.
The second premise is the reason that so many people find the ontological argument to be unconvincing. In order for this argument to be effective, the second premise must be assumed to be true by both parties in the discussion. This means that this argument will be completely useless against the position of true atheism. Fortunately, most of those who call themselves atheists are really just agnostics, and this argument is very effective against agnosticism. It is vitally important, however, that we not simply assume that our opponent agrees with the premise that God’s existence is possible. If we do, he may decide to pretend to be an atheist and challenge us to prove that premise before he will consider the rest of the argument. If we can, we should preface this argument with a discussion which leads our opponent to admit that God’s existence is possible. Once he admits this, then we can proceed with the first two premises.
The remainder of the argument hinges on the definition of God as a necessary being. This is where previous renditions of the ontological argument have been attacked the most, and I think that this is where my argument really sets itself apart. In the other arguments, God is defined as the greatest conceivable being or as the maximally great being, and since a being who actually exists is greater than a being that does not exist, the greatest conceivable being must be a being who actually exists. The challenge to this reasoning is that someone can conceive of just about anything that would be greater if it actually existed. For example, the greatest conceivable unicorn would be a unicorn that actually exists. Therefore, unicorns must actually exist. Now, there are solutions to this challenge, but they tend to be much more complex than the challenge itself and are therefore prone to lead to confusion. In my argument, I sought to preempt this challenge by focusing on God’s necessity rather than His actuality. Thus, while I retained the greatest conceivable being terminology, I defined the greatest conceivable being as a being whose existence is necessary in order for anything else to exist. This definition effectively eliminates things like unicorns from being inserted into the argument.
Once I realized the value of focusing on the necessity of God’s existence, I began searching for a way to rephrase my argument to circumvent any challenge for me to prove His necessity. I was looking for a simple way to lead my opponent into an admission that God is a being without whom nothing else could exist, and I realized that God had already provided a solution within the pages of the Bible. In Acts 17, we read of Paul preaching on Mars Hill, and find there the statement about God that “in him we live, and move, and have our being.” Then, in the opening verses of John’s Gospel, we find the claim that “All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.” These verses reveal to us that the God of the Bible is a God who exists necessarily – He is a being without whom nothing else could exist. Since the Bible already describes God as a necessary being, all we have to do is rephrase the second premise to state that it is possible that the God of the Bible exists. If our opponent admits this, then we can point out that the God of the Bible is described as a necessary being, and if he objects to this description, the burden of proof is on him to explain why he thinks it is possible for any God to exist except for the God of the Bible. Thus we can eliminate the challenge to prove God’s necessity by changing the focus of our argument from a generic creator God to the specific God of the Bible.
Another advantage of this change in focus is that it allows us to express the ontological argument in a much more comprehensible manner. My first rendition contained eight steps, but if we change the focus to the God of the Bible instead of a generic God, then the entire argument can be stated in just four sentences. Here is what the argument looks like after making this change:
A. Anything that is possible must exist if it is also necessary.
B. It is possible that the God of the Bible exists.
C. According to Acts 17:28 and John 1:3, the God of the Bible is a necessary being.
D. Therefore, the God of the Bible must exist.
This new, leaner version of the ontological argument is much easier to understand and nearly impossible to reject. The first premise can be illustrated with sufficient examples to easily prove its validity. The second premise is admitted by almost all atheists. The third premise follows naturally from the second, and the conclusion is the only one that can possibly be drawn from the premises. With this argument in our arsenal, we can confidently take on any agnostic with the assurance that his own admissions lead to the truth that God exists.
Unfortunately, the majority of the presentations of this argument are unintelligible to the average American. For example, the first recorded use of the ontological argument come from a man named Anselm who wrote the following in A.D. 1078:
“Thus even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be conceived is in the understanding, since when he hears this, he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. Thus if that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the understanding alone, then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is itself that than which a greater can be conceived. But surely this cannot be. Thus without doubt something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, both in the understanding and in reality.”
Anselm’s argument makes perfect sense, and it was well understood by the people of his day, but most modern readers are hopelessly confused by the end of the first sentence. Over the years, this original argument has received various updates and improvements until it finally reached its current form under the influence of Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. Dr. Craig’s presentation of Plantinga’s argument has become quite famous because of his inclusion of it in his debates with world renowned atheists. However, even this modern version is still unintelligible to most readers. Here is the Plantinga argument as presented by Dr. Craig:
- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
Of course, most people can see that Dr. Craig is using the term “maximally great being” as a reference to God, but when he speaks of possible worlds and actual worlds and some possible worlds and every possible world, he tends to lose most of his audience. This is unfortunate because Dr. Craig’s argument just like that of Anselm is a very sound argument; it simply is not presented in a format that is of any benefit to the average American Christian.
Once I realized that the primary objection to the ontological argument is that it is incomprehensible, I began working on an alternative presentation. Before I could do that, however, I needed to make sure that I understood the argument correctly, so I went back to the original and read Anselm’s Proslogion in which he presented his argument. Then, I read Descartes’ Fifth Meditation to get his argument and so on all the way up to the current argument by Dr. Craig. Once I completed my reading, I decided to just rephrase the argument in my first rendition and then focus on simplicity in the second. Here is my first rendition:
A. Anything that is possible must exist if it is also necessary.
B. It is possible that God exists.
C. God is the greatest conceivable being.
D. The greatest conceivable being is one without whom nothing else could exist.
E. A being without whom nothing else could exist is a necessary being.
F. God is a necessary being. (C + D + E)
G. If it is possible that God exists, then He must exist necessarily.
H. Therefore God exists. (A + B + G)
As you can see, my first rendition shifted the focus from Anselm’s antiquated language of existing in the understanding versus existing in reality, but I found Plantinga’s possible worlds and actual worlds to be just as cumbersome. Instead of either of their terms, I chose to express my argument with the concepts of possibility and necessity. This change allowed me to present an irrefutable truth as my first premise – Anything that is possible must exist if it is also necessary.
To illustrate the truth of this statement, let me point out that there are things which are both necessary and impossible. For example, in order for 1+2=4 to be correct, it would be necessary for either the number 1 to be equal to the number 2 or for the number 4 to be equal to the number 3. Although one of these two is necessary, neither of them is possible, and we can conclude that the equation 1+2=4 does not exist as a true description of reality. To illustrate it another way, we could imagine an island with several palm trees. In order for an island to exist, it is both possible and necessary that it be surrounded by water. Therefore, if we know that we are on an island, then we can conclude that the island is surrounded by water. However, it is not necessary that the island have any palm trees on it. It is possible that there are palm trees, but it is not necessary. Therefore, we cannot conclude that there are palm trees nearby just because we know that we are on an island. There may be palm trees and there may not be palm trees. They are only possible and not necessary. Thus, we can see that the first premise of my argument is a true statement about how we can prove that something exists without actually observing it. If an object is both possible and necessary, then we can know that it exists whether we can see it or not.
The second premise is the reason that so many people find the ontological argument to be unconvincing. In order for this argument to be effective, the second premise must be assumed to be true by both parties in the discussion. This means that this argument will be completely useless against the position of true atheism. Fortunately, most of those who call themselves atheists are really just agnostics, and this argument is very effective against agnosticism. It is vitally important, however, that we not simply assume that our opponent agrees with the premise that God’s existence is possible. If we do, he may decide to pretend to be an atheist and challenge us to prove that premise before he will consider the rest of the argument. If we can, we should preface this argument with a discussion which leads our opponent to admit that God’s existence is possible. Once he admits this, then we can proceed with the first two premises.
The remainder of the argument hinges on the definition of God as a necessary being. This is where previous renditions of the ontological argument have been attacked the most, and I think that this is where my argument really sets itself apart. In the other arguments, God is defined as the greatest conceivable being or as the maximally great being, and since a being who actually exists is greater than a being that does not exist, the greatest conceivable being must be a being who actually exists. The challenge to this reasoning is that someone can conceive of just about anything that would be greater if it actually existed. For example, the greatest conceivable unicorn would be a unicorn that actually exists. Therefore, unicorns must actually exist. Now, there are solutions to this challenge, but they tend to be much more complex than the challenge itself and are therefore prone to lead to confusion. In my argument, I sought to preempt this challenge by focusing on God’s necessity rather than His actuality. Thus, while I retained the greatest conceivable being terminology, I defined the greatest conceivable being as a being whose existence is necessary in order for anything else to exist. This definition effectively eliminates things like unicorns from being inserted into the argument.
Once I realized the value of focusing on the necessity of God’s existence, I began searching for a way to rephrase my argument to circumvent any challenge for me to prove His necessity. I was looking for a simple way to lead my opponent into an admission that God is a being without whom nothing else could exist, and I realized that God had already provided a solution within the pages of the Bible. In Acts 17, we read of Paul preaching on Mars Hill, and find there the statement about God that “in him we live, and move, and have our being.” Then, in the opening verses of John’s Gospel, we find the claim that “All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.” These verses reveal to us that the God of the Bible is a God who exists necessarily – He is a being without whom nothing else could exist. Since the Bible already describes God as a necessary being, all we have to do is rephrase the second premise to state that it is possible that the God of the Bible exists. If our opponent admits this, then we can point out that the God of the Bible is described as a necessary being, and if he objects to this description, the burden of proof is on him to explain why he thinks it is possible for any God to exist except for the God of the Bible. Thus we can eliminate the challenge to prove God’s necessity by changing the focus of our argument from a generic creator God to the specific God of the Bible.
Another advantage of this change in focus is that it allows us to express the ontological argument in a much more comprehensible manner. My first rendition contained eight steps, but if we change the focus to the God of the Bible instead of a generic God, then the entire argument can be stated in just four sentences. Here is what the argument looks like after making this change:
A. Anything that is possible must exist if it is also necessary.
B. It is possible that the God of the Bible exists.
C. According to Acts 17:28 and John 1:3, the God of the Bible is a necessary being.
D. Therefore, the God of the Bible must exist.
This new, leaner version of the ontological argument is much easier to understand and nearly impossible to reject. The first premise can be illustrated with sufficient examples to easily prove its validity. The second premise is admitted by almost all atheists. The third premise follows naturally from the second, and the conclusion is the only one that can possibly be drawn from the premises. With this argument in our arsenal, we can confidently take on any agnostic with the assurance that his own admissions lead to the truth that God exists.