Does Bodily Autonomy Create a Right to Abortion?

One of the most popular arguments among baby killers today is the argument from bodily autonomy.  Those presenting this argument claim that restrictions on abortion are unethical because the government has no right to tell a woman what she can and cannot do with her own body, but this claim is based on a flawed understanding of bodily autonomy. What the term “bodily autonomy” actually means is that the government cannot sanction an act that harms an unwilling participant for the benefit of another. When properly understood, the concept of bodily autonomy prohibits the government from sanctioning abortions because the act of abortion harms the prenatal child who is an unwilling participant in that act.

In America, the doctrine of bodily autonomy draws its authority from the God-given, and thus unalienable, right to life as recognized by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment where the state is denied the right to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  An excellent example of this doctrine can be seen in the case of McFall v. Shimp.[1]

In this case, Robert McFall was suffering from a rare bone marrow disease which would cause him to die if he did not receive a bone marrow transplant.  McFall’s cousin, Mr. Shimp, was the only compatible donor available, but he refused to submit to the very painful process of having his bone marrow extracted.  McFall took his plight before the court and asked the court to force his cousin to undergo the procedure.  The court rejected McFall’s request and concluded that “for our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded.”

McFall v. Shimp correctly applied the Fourteenth Amendment in concluding that the state could not take action to deprive Shimp of his liberty and property in order to save the life of McFall.  This case reveals that the doctrine of bodily autonomy is intended to protect the one against whom an action is being proposed - Shimp could not be forced to save the life of McFall.  By permitting McFall to die of his disease, the court indicated that this doctrine of bodily autonomy does nothing to prevent a naturally occurring death.  It serves only to prevent actions which would benefit one person against the will of and to the detriment of the other.

The argument can be made, however, that this particular example is not equivalent to the situation that exists between a woman and her unborn child.  A more equivalent example can be derived from cases involving the bodily autonomy of conjoined twins. There have not been any such cases in the American judicial system, but there was one which occurred in the British court a few years ago.[2] 

In that case, the British court decided that conjoined twins Mary and Jodie should be separated against the wishes of the parents and with the full understanding that the separation would kill Mary.  The court reached that decision precisely because there is no provision in British law that expressly prohibits the state from taking the life of an innocent person.  Their decision was based instead upon the proposal that the separation was in the best interest of both children.  They concluded that Mary's life would "be simply worth nothing to her;" that "to prolong Mary's life for these few months would be very seriously to her disadvantage," and that "though Mary has a right to life, she has little right to be alive."  The court did conclude that the "surgery would amount to a positive act of invasion of [Mary's] bodily integrity," but without a prohibition against such a violation, they did not find this to be sufficient reason for preventing the surgery.

American law, however, does include a prohibition against violating one person's bodily autonomy for the benefit of another.  Had this case been tried in an American court, the finding that the "surgery would amount to a positive act of invasion of [Mary's] bodily integrity" would have provided sufficient grounds for the judge to prevent the surgery.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state is forbidden from sanctioning any action that causes the unwilling death or suffering of an innocent person.  Shimp could not be compelled to sacrifice his bodily integrity for McFall, Mary would not have been forced to give up her life for Jodie, and the life of the unborn child cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of the mother.

Thus we see that the argument from bodily autonomy not only fails to support the pro-choice argument but also provides solid, legal support for prohibitions against abortion.  Abortion, like the surgery that separated Mary and Jodie, constitutes a violation of the bodily autonomy of the unborn child, and as the court found in McFall v. Shimp, permitting such a violation "would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded."  Such actions cannot be sanctioned by the state.
 
Baby killers like to claim that the bodily autonomy of the mother is violated by the act of pregnancy, but pregnancy is not an action. It is a naturally occurring condition.  The doctrine of bodily autonomy has the exact same application to pregnancy as it has to conjoined twins.  Conjoined twins are equal participants in a naturally occurring condition just as the mother and the child are equal participants in the naturally occurring condition of pregnancy.  If one of the twins were to kill his sibling in an effort to escape their condition, he would be guilty of murder, and the same is true of a mother who kills her child in an effort to escape the condition of pregnancy. In both cases, the action of killing is a violation of the bodily autonomy of the victim.



[1] McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 - Pa: Court of Common Pleas 1978

[2] Case No: B1/2000/2969